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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When setting interest rates, central banks often strive for a balance between the optimality of their policy on the one hand and the robustness on the other. Based on a particular model of the economy and a well-defined objective function, monetary policy wants to implement the optimal policy path. At the same time, however, the model that describes the economy is typically not known with certainty. As a consequence, central bankers and their staff refer to rules that are known to be relatively robust with respect to deviations of the model from the benchmark specification. One such rule is the Taylor (1993) rule that prescribes a simple relationship between the policy instrument and both inflation and output.
Recently, Røisland and Sveen (2010) study these two motives. They specify a central bank's loss function that is a weighted average between a standard part that increases in inflation and output variances and a non-standard part that penalizes squared deviations of the interest rate from its level prescribed by the Taylor rule. They simulate a series of economic models under this particular loss function under the assumption that monetary policy is able to commit to the optimal policy path. Their results show a clear trade-off between robustness and optimality. Putting some weight on deviations from the robust rule leads to a welfare loss but avoids high losses if an alternative model is the true description of the economy.
In this paper we show that if the central bank cannot commit to the first-best policy and instead formulates policy under discretion, the trade-off can break down. Delegating monetary policy to a central bank that attaches some weight on deviations from the Taylor rule can actually improve welfare in terms of inflation and output volatility. Put differently, policy should be delegated to a central banker that cross-checks optimal interest rate setting with information from a simple Taylor rule.
The reason for this finding is that placing a weight on deviations from a Taylor rule increases the effective weight of inflation volatility in the loss function, which reduces the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy. 2 Since the public knows that inflation will respond less to a cost-push shock, expected future inflation is subdued.
Stabilizing inflation becomes less costly in terms of future output contraction. The welfare-enhancing role of this modified loss function crucially depends on the size of the stabilization bias, i.e. on the degree of persistence in the cost-push shock process, and the role of demand shocks. A higher persistence eventually translates into higher volatility and aggravates the stabilization bias. 3 The paper's main rationale draws on the seminal approach of Rogoff (1985) , who pioneered the idea of modifying the central bank's loss function in order to address the suboptimal outcome under discretion. Alternative approaches to solve the stabilization bias through the delegation of a non-standard loss-function are presented in Walsh (1995) and Walsh (2003) . This paper shows that instead of appointing a conservative central banker as in Rogoff (1985) , i.e. a central banker who attaches a larger weight on inflation stabilisation than the social planner, delegating monetary policy to a central banker who puts some weight on a Taylor rule mitigates the bias of discretionary policy. Alternatively, the paper's main idea can be interpreted in terms of the composition of a monetary policy committee that takes consensus decisions about interest rate setting. Under these conditions, appointing some committee members that follow a Taylor rule is beneficial. Delegating policy to a central bank that cross-checks interest rate decisions with the prescription of an instrument rule is an alternative way to enhance the welfare performance of discretionary monetary policy. It is probably easier to implement than appointing a Rogoff-type conservative central banker. 4 Central banks routinely use the result from a Taylor rule as an input to their policy deliberation. For example, Taylor (2005) argues that "central bank staffs sometimes review recommendations of policy rules with the monetary policy committee along with simulations of interest rate paths implied by the rules in future periods. This would serve as a 'cross-check' ... ." Likewise, Qvigstad (2005) , the deputy governor of the Norwegian central bank, argues that "it is ... necessary to cross-check our interest rate setting by assessing the policy in light of simple rules which are less dependent on a specifica n a l y t i c a lf r a m e w o r k " . 5 Consider the simplest version of a New-Keynesian model, which represents a set of loglinearized equilibrium conditions derived from a standard sticky-price general equilibrium model. Inflation is described by a forward-looking Phillips curve (1) . Here   is the inflation rate,   the output gap, and E  is the expectations operator. The discount factor is denoted by 1 and ,t h es l o p ec o e fficient of the Phillips curve, is inversely related to the degree of nominal rigidities
The IS curve (2) describes the demand side of the economy
where   is the risk-free interest rate controlled by the central bank and the coefficient  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The cost-push shock   introduces a stabilization motive for monetary policy and exhibits some degree of persistence described by the AR(1) coefficient 0 ≤ 1
We first sketch the basic mechanism in the absence of demand shocks. To complete the model, however, a demand shock is introduced below. The next section completes the model with a description of monetary policy.
The central bank's loss function
The social planner and the central bank share a standard loss function    that is quadratic in inflation and output gap deviations from their respective target values, which are set to zero. This amounts to
where output enters with a relative weight 0.
The crucial assumption in this paper is that monetary policy is delegated to a central bank that is also concerned about the robustness of its interest rate policy. The central bank cross-checks optimal monetary policy with information from a simple Taylor (1993) rule. In particular, the central bank wants to minimize squared deviations of the policy instrument   from the path described by the Taylor rule. This motive is captured by the loss function
where
gives the interest rate prescribed by the Taylor 
The loss function collapses to the standard case for  =0 . As mentioned in the introduction, we can also understand  as measuring the share of members of the monetary policy committee following a Taylor rule. In the remaining sections, we will evaluate the effect of  on welfare.
Optimal monetary policy
The Lagrangian considered by the optimizing central bank is
where    and    are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the Phillips curve and the consumption Euler equation, respectively.
We assume that a commitment technology is unavailable. Hence, the central bank formulates optimal monetary policy under discretion taking expectations as given.
6
The first-order conditions are
which can be rearranged to
with  ≡  +   +   . Interestingly, to the extent that 0, the central bank's concern about deviations from the Taylor rule drives a wedge into the optimality condition known from standard models. The wedge is larger, the smaller ,i . e . t h e larger the relative weight of inflation stabilization. A given inflation rate is addressed by a more vigorous output contraction if 0.
Alternatively, for 0 the first-order conditions can be rearranged to
For  =1, the benchmark Taylor rule obtains.
The solution will consist of inflation and output being a linear function of the model's only exogenous state variable, i.e. the cost-push shock. Guessing a solution of the form
We use the method of undetermined coefficients to obtain the solutions for the coefficients   and   as
with
This solution is derived in the appendix. Note that under the assumptions made before, i.e. 1, 0 ≤ 1,a n d   1, the denominator Ω is strictly positive.
For  =0the solution collapses to the standard result for inflation and output under discretionary monetary policy, i.e.
3T h e w e l f a r e e ffects of delegation
Analytical results
For the ease of exposition, let us assume that  =0 . One way to overcome the stabilization bias in this case is to delegate policy to a central bank that differs from the social planner with respect to the weight attached to conflicting policy objectives. 
The minimization problem results in the following optimality condition
Since   1, the optimal output weight of the central bank lies below the weight the social planner attaches to output gap fluctuations. Hence, the social planner chooses a central banker who puts more weight on inflation stabilization than the social planner. The central bank is conservative in the sense of Rogoff (1985) .
Rather than delegating policy to conservative central banker, this paper offers an alternative delegation scheme. Let us go back to the assumption that  =   . Instead, we show that delegating policy to a central bank with 0 also improves the discretionary solution. In contrast to the Rogoff-type solution, however, we cannot 8 easily derive an optimal value of , which forces us to calibrate the model. To compute the variances of inflation and output as well as the resulting welfare metric, we use standard parameter values taken from the literature. In particular, we set  =0 25,  =0 1,   =0 3 and  =0 99. The inverse of the real interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand is set to  =18. The persistence of the shock process is calibrated to  =075. Discretionary monetary policy suffers from a stabilisation bias, i.e. inflation volatility is suboptimally high. This bias can be mitigated if policy is delegated to a central bank that attaches some weight on a rule with a strong response to inflation. With this additional constraint, the relative weight of inflationintheeffective loss function increases, thus leading to a reduction in inflation volatility. 6 In figure (2) we plot the resulting welfare loss if the central banker responds only to inflation, i.e. for   =0. In this case the welfare-improving effect of attaching a small weight to the Taylor rule is clearly visible for large values of   .
For a much smaller degree of persistence, i.e. for  =0 50, a welfare gain can be realized once we accept a somewhat higher real interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand, e.g.  =1 . Again, see figure (3), there is an optimal value of  around 015 for which the welfare loss is lowest. For larger values of ,h o w e v e r ,w e l f a r e sharply deteriorates. The welfare-enhancing effect prevails even for a relatively small stabilization bias. Attaching too much weight on deviations from the Taylor rule, however, sharply increases the welfare loss in this case. Since the Taylor rule requires a strong interest rate response to inflation, a high interest rate elasticity of output translates this interest rate response into a suboptimally large adjustment of output.
As a bottom line, it appears that, for a wide range of parameters, attaching a small weight to deviations of the interest rate from the level suggested by the Taylor rule is indeed beneficial. For our baseline scenario with a persistence of  =0 75 and a moderate inflation response in the Taylor rule, however, the welfare loss falls monotonically in . The reason is that the simple model lacks a demand shock. In the absence of a Taylor rule restriction for optimal policy, i.e. for  =0 , demand shocks can be fully stabilized. With a positive weight on a Taylor rule, however, demand shocks lead to fluctuations in inflation and output and, as a consequence, to a welfare loss.
Therefore, allowing for demand shocks gives rise to a detrimental effect on welfare if the central bank uses information from the Taylor rule. It follows that the optimal  trades-off this welfare loss against the gain from mitigating the stabilization bias.
We address this issue in the following subsection.
Results from a simulated model
To address the role of demand shocks, this subsection presents a simulated model and derives both welfare and impulse responses. We add a demand shock   to the IS curve
and 0 ≤ 1. All other parts of the model remain unchanged. We set  =  =075,   =1 8 and   =0 3 and use standard algorithms to solve the model. Figure (4) plots the resulting welfare loss    as a function of  (see the blue line). In contrast to the supply shocks-only model in figure (1) , the full model gives rise to minimum welfare loss at  =025 even for   =18.
Figures (5) and (6) depict the responses of output, inflation and the nominal interest rate to a supply and demand shock, respectively. Following a supply shock, the central bank raises the interest rate more strongly for  =0 25 than for  =0 .A sar e s u l t , the inflation response is depressed while the output response is amplified. After a demand shock, in contrast, the interest rate is raised less vigorously if the central bank avoids deviations from the Taylor rule, which prevents output and inflation from being fully stabilized.
These results strengthen those from the previous subsection. Delegating monetary policy to a monetary policy committee that puts some weight on deviations from the Taylor rule results in a welfare gain.
4 A simple extension: the role of a working capital constraint
In this section we evaluate how the existence of a credit market alters the basic finding. A particularly simple way to include a credit market is to allow for firms holding working capital in oder to finance the wage bill. Firms pay wages at the beginning of the period and receive the proceeds from selling their products at the end of the period. To bridge this gap, firms hold working capital borrowed at the nominal interest rate   . Such a cost channel is introduced into the New Keynesian model by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) . They show that the aggregate supply schedule becomes
where  is the elasticity of labor supply, and , describes the size of the cost capital channel. Under this cash-in-advance constraint for firms, the nominal interest rate enters the Phillips curve as a higher interest rate increases the costs of holding working capital and, thus, firms marginal costs. This proposal follows the same logic as the seminal approach of Rogoff (1985) . If commitment is not feasible, delegating a non-standard loss-function to the central bank is beneficial. In contrast to Rogoff (1985) , however, this paper's proposition is easy to implement since the Taylor rule is widely used as a benchmark, e.g. at the
Norges Bank, against which interest rate decisions are evaluated. 7 I nt h ew a k eo ft h er e c e n tfinancial crisis, critiques of the Fed argue that around 2004-2006 monetary policy deviated from the policy rule that describes interest rate setting over the previous decade. Overly expansionary policy, the argument goes, laid the ground for the build-up of property price bubbles. The debate about this "Great Deviation" (Taylor 2010) suggests that the benefits from cross-checking optimal policy with a Taylor rule might go beyond the stabilization policy addressed in this paper.
7A p p e n d i x
This appendix presents the solution for inflation and output. The first-order conditions can be reformulated to
Replacing   by the IS curve and using our conjectured solutions with E   +1 =   and E   +1 =   gives
or
For  =0we get the standard trade-off that is well-known from e.g. the work of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999)
Inserting (21) as well as the conjectured solution into the Phillips curve gives
We can collect terms to obtain the solution coefficient for inflation
with Ω =  (1 − )(1− )+ (1 − )(1− ) (23)
From (21) and (22) the solution coefficient for output is obtained 
